Government Educational Licensing: Educational Accreditation as an Escalating Institutional Project

Before even considering the government documents that address the topic of educational accreditation, let’s first consider why educational accreditation is an economic behavior that is seen as an appropriate task for governments and non-profit institutions to undertake. Among those with an institutionalist or managerial style of economic thinking in government, this is not a debate, accreditation is absolutely necessary to prevent the fraudulent distribution of worthless degrees by so-called “diploma mills”. While the neoclassical interest in competitive markets has, as we’ll see, its own rare advocates in government, the dominant theme, at least in statements from the government, is that signal educational quality ought to be the job of a institutions. The actual form this institution takes is not monolithic though. A complex array of private institutional accreditors, each recognized by the Council on Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) and the Department of Education, is allowed to individually grant accredited status to educational institutions either by geographic region or by professional disciplinary area. This system, while decentralized and therefore fairly flexible, presents problems that institutionalists seek to address with greater standardization across the disparate accrediting boards. While this doesn’t necessarily mean consolidation, it has meant cooperation, particularly via the relatively new mechanism of the CHEA, which was only created in 1996 in order to coordinate the operations of the regional accreditors and act as a single national voice for educational quality assurance.

In order to get a robust sense of the conversation that is occurring among government officials with regards to the challenge of educational accreditation, we’ll take a look at three documents: H.R. 773 of the 110th Congress, H.R. 838 of the 108th Congress, and a 2006 Issue Paper from the Secretary of Education’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education entitled, “Assuring Quality in Higher Education”. The first two pieces are contrasting bills presented in the US Congress arguing that very different sorts of action ought to be taken in order to modify the educational accreditation apparatus of the country. The final paper provides a deeper analysis of the issues facing the accreditation process, but frames the entire problem in an institutionalist context, thereby laying out the foundation for an escalating institutional role in accreditation.

H.R. 773 of the 110th Congress is cited as the, “Diploma Integrity Protection Act of 2007” and is of particular interest because it is a very recent piece of legislation that may come in for more public scrutiny as it moves through the House and Senate. The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in order, “To reduce and prevent the sale of use of fraudulent degrees in order to protect the integrity of valid higher education degrees that are used for Federal purposes.” The bill’s approach to the issue of educational accreditation is institutionalist, stating, for example, that the “preeminence of American universities” is threatened by the trafficking of fraudulent degrees. Its main solution to the problem of the potentially “$500,000,000” industry in diploma fraud is the creation of a temporary governmental “task force” comprised of 19 representatives from across the political and private spectrum. The bill repeatedly highlights the fact that fraudulent diplomas could be used to illegitimately obtain Federal jobs, and notes that one study that discovered numerous working government employees had obtained their post by presenting fake or shoddy credentials during application. Among other things, it’s stated that this practice “imperils the national security of the Unites States.” (5)

The harsh terms presented in this bill to describe the severity of the fraudulent credential problem, and the ways in which it would be swiftly brought under control, also evoked the managerial style of economic thinking. Essentially, the bill is seeking to immediately expand the Federal role in managing/influencing the accrediting apparatus of the country, with the justification that fake credentials can be used to obtain Federal jobs. A neoclassical economist may look at such a bill and ask whether or not this difficulty can be handled at the level of the Federal employees in charge of recruiting and screening applicants, a managerial economist may see this as a problem to be addressed immediately using the machinery of state. On pages 21-22 of the bill, the “Conduct Prohibited” is laid out, and suggested as a modification to FTC rules, and among other things, it specifies that an institution cannot distribute academic degrees without recognition from the Secretary of Education and accreditation by one of the recognized accrediting bodies. This essentially permits the Federal government to shut down almost any for-profit educational establishment that hasn’t met accrediting criteria, raising the activities of the accreditors to an even higher level of importance under the law. Rather than being the gatekeepers for billions of dollars in Federal student loans, this bill, if it became law, would convert accrediting agencies into the first and strongest line of defense against educational “counterfeiting”, however that comes to be defined.

For the record, another potential style that could be attributed to H.R. 773 is the moral/critical style, partially due to the bill’s multiple claims that consumers are often the unwitting victims of “diploma mills”. The assertion that consumers often have a genuine belief that their credentials are going to be valid, and are the unwitting victims of unscrupulous for-profit educators, certainly suggests a moral imperative to protect the public from being morally wronged in this way.

In stark contrast, two members of the 108th congress brought legislation that also addressed the issue of educational accreditation, but with the aim of significantly diminishing its power and influence. In February 2003, congressman Tom Petri brought H.R. 838 in front of the House of Representatives, before it was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, where it eventually died when the 108th congress and the books were cleared. H.R. 838, which was cited as the “Higher Education Accrediting Responsibility Act of 2003”, is the work of neoclassical economic thinkers. Petri, and the bill’s co-sponsor, William Lipinski, seek to, among other things, “…end the virtual monopoly that today’s accrediting agencies enjoy, and require them to operate in a competitive environment like any other industry.” (3) Their primary complaint is the role of accrediting agencies as “gatekeepers” for the Federal student aid program. The fact that an institution’s accreditation determines whether its students will be eligible for Federal student loans makes these agencies power on par with the Department of Education. Another neoclassical theme is the idea that additional bureaucratic costs are passed on to the consumer, which is brought to bear here as well: “The time and effort required of institutions of higher education to comply with the accreditation process imposes costs which must ultimately be borne by students and parents.” (3) While it is not clear how much of a battle was fought over this bill, which effectively would have repealed the accrediting agency’s authority to approve Federal student aid, it is (along with HR 773) certainly evidence that this is recognized as a real issue on Capitol Hill, and the solutions to the problem are not monolithic.

Lastly, a document from within the Department of Education addresses many of the most current issues seen with the present accreditation system. It will be useful to note how these issues are presented though, since it ultimately reflects an interest and preference for institutionalist solutions (which shouldn’t really be surprising, since the Department of Education is an institution). The paper is an “Issue Paper” from the larger project, the Secretary of Education’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education, and is entitled, “Assuring Quality in Higher Education”. The entire first half of the paper describes the present structure of the accreditation, which is interesting background reading, but not as relevant to a discussion of the document’s economic style. The second section of the paper, which frames the “key issues” for discussion, provides much more of an indication regarding the document’s tone. The first such issue, called “Assuring Performance”, contains statements that seem to highlight the role of government in accreditors’ accountability: “States have taken a major leadership role in establishing performance accountability systems to drive improvement in higher education.” (6). The concluding paragraph here notes that the federal government and accreditation organizations have done a lot toward improving the performance-based accountability of the schools and institutions they accredit, but it points out that implementation has been somewhat inconsistent across the accreditation community. This points to an interest in standardization of accountability mechanisms across accrediting organizations and the federal government. If this is the main concern taken from a discussion of accreditation, then it certainly sets out accreditation as a largely institutionalist project that will require enormous effort and focus by the government in order to improve and standardize.

The other two issues presented are, “Open Standards and Processes” and “Consistency and Transparency”. On this issue of open standards, the desire to address new and emerging forms of education and instruction, such as distance-learning and for-profit universities, is discussed. The conclusion drawn however is again institutionalist in nature: “Some accreditation agencies have reviewed leading quality standards…[but] significant concerns still remain as to whether accreditation organizations are going far enough.” (7) And lastly, on the issue of consistency and transparency, it is mentioned that accreditation agencies, under the centralizing influence of the CHEA, have begun developing a single set of guidelines for educational quality. The section also notes the role CHEA has played in promoting credit transfer between institutions that have been accredited by disparate accrediting bodies. (8)

In a sense it is very desirable to have these issues addressed, so the ability for the public to understand accreditation and benefit from its ability to promote credit transfer and equivalence across institutions is ensured. The question here is whether or not the establishment government bureaucracy is self-reflective enough to consider both sides to this issue as the Congress has clearly done. While this is certainly not a raging debate on the Senate floor (let’s hope that have better things to do), it remains an issue: how much government- or institutionally-administered licensing could be taken over by parties in the private sector? Or at the very least, should accrediting agencies led by the CHEA really be the gatekeepers of the Federal student aid program? Despite the legitimacy of these questions and their discussion in Congress, it does not appear to be of interest to the Secretary of Education’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education; not hugely surprising, since they’d be more naturally concerned with how best to do the job themselves, rather than how others could do it better.

Works Cited:

HR 773. “To reduce and prevent the sale and use of fraudulent degrees in order to protect the integrity of valid higher education degrees that are used for Federal purposes.” 110th US Congress. January 31, 2007.

HR 838. “To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide greater academic freedom for institutions of higher education, and for other purposes.” 108th US Congress. February 13, 2003.

Schray, Vickie. “ISSUE PAPER: Assuring Quality in Higher Education: Key Issues and Questions for Changing Accreditation in the United States.” A NATIONAL DIALOGUE: The Secretary of Education’s Commission on the Future of Higher Education. 2006.